

# Empire by Invitation: Greek Political Strategies and Roman Imperial Interventions in the Second Century B.C.E.\*

---

CRAIGE CHAMPION

*Syracuse University*

**SUMMARY:** Greek politicians in the second century B.C.E. increasingly turned to Roman authorities in order to defeat their political opposition. Charges of demagoguery and socio-economic revolution became commonplace in these political struggles in the presence of Roman authority. This evidence provides a key to understanding a famous inscription dating to 144/143 B.C.E. (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684), which records a letter from the Roman praetorian proconsul to Macedonia, relaying his ruling on recent civil unrest in Achaean Dyme. More importantly, Greek appeals to Roman power, such as we find in *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684, support a model of second-century Roman imperial expansion in Greece focusing on the imperial periphery rather than the imperial metropole.

SCHOLARS IN EARLIER GENERATIONS REPRESENTED HELLENISTIC GREEK POLEIS as degenerate shadows of their Classical Greek forebears, whose political autonomy had been worn away by the great Hellenistic monarchies, droves of mercenary soldiers, and severe social and economic dislocations. In more recent times, scholars have countered this reconstruction, emphasizing the vibrancy and independence of Hellenistic poleis in political, military, and cultural terms.<sup>1</sup> Framed by consideration of a famous inscription from Achaean

\* I wish to thank Robert Morstein-Marx, who graciously discussed *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684 with me and kindly allowed me to examine his squeeze of the inscription. For the Dyme inscription, I have used the text at Morstein-Marx [Kallet-Marx] 1995a: 131. I also extend thanks to audiences at Scripps College and Syracuse University, as well as to the anonymous readers of the journal, for helpful comments and criticism. Any remaining faults are of course my own. I dedicate this study to Erich Gruen upon the occasion of his retirement.

<sup>1</sup> For autonomous Hellenistic poleis, see e.g. Habicht 1997 (Athens); Ma 1999 (diplomacy between Antiochus III and poleis of western Asia Minor); Ma 2000 (military capabilities of Hellenistic poleis). For overviews of scholarly trends on Hellenistic poleis, see Cartledge 1997: 1–15; Billows 2003. All dates are B.C.E.

Dyme (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684), this article attempts to create a median between these two viewpoints. It argues that the second-century Greek polis was a primary agent in its own political subjection to Roman power, and that historical evidence supports a “pericentric” rather than a “metrocentric” model for understanding Roman imperial expansion in Greece in this period.

In their bid for power and position both within the Hellenistic polis in domestic disputes and among Hellenistic poleis in interstate relations, Greek politicians routinely charged their rivals before Roman authorities with demagoguery and plans for radical socio-economic reform. In so doing they appear to have acted on what they perceived as Roman conservative class prejudices. Evidence for this Greek political strategy in the face of Roman power provides an attractive interpretative context for the inscription from Achaean Dyme, though lacunae in the epigraphic text preclude definitive conclusions. The incident at Dyme clearly involved the overthrow of a political constitution approved by Rome, the burning of public records, a direct appeal to Roman authority, and with Roman consent the execution of the principals in the revolutionary movement. R. Morstein-Marx has indeed referred to this text as “the most striking example of Roman intervention in the affairs of mainland Greece between the Achaean and Mithridatic wars” (1995a: 129). The inscription will therefore serve as a dramatic point of departure for the following study of the Greek polis and the nature of Roman imperialism in Greece in the second century.<sup>2</sup>

## I. STASIS IN ACHAEAN DYME IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684 was unearthed from the ancient site of Achaean Dyme in 1797 and now stands in the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge. The inscription reveals that in 144/143 a Dymaeen embassy headed by the politician Cyllanius brought political measures of a compatriot named Sosus, an associate of

<sup>2</sup> Ambiguity in usage of the terms “empire” and “imperialism,” which I employ in this article, demands an attempt at definition. Classical theories of imperialism, presupposing advanced, industrialized, capitalist economies (e.g. Hobson, the Marxist-Leninist tradition), obviously cannot apply here. More recently, Hardt and Negri 2000 (see with collected critical essays in Balakrishnan 2003 and in Passavant and Dean 2004; cf. Hardt and Negri 2004), have posited a twenty-first century “Empire” that is postcolonial, immanent, globalized, and cybernetic. Such neo-Marxist, post-Foucauldian formulations are *a fortiori* irrelevant to the historical study of Mediterranean antiquity. For my purposes, the formulation of Doyle 1986: 45 suffices, “Empire... is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire.”

Sosus whose name terminated in *-μίσκος*, and a third Dymaeian politician, Timotheus, to the attention of Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, the Roman praetorian proconsul appointed to Macedonia.<sup>3</sup> The epigraphic text is a letter from the proconsul, relaying his ruling on recent disturbances in Dyme. It refers to injustices, specifically to burning and destruction of public records and abolition of the constitution granted by Rome. Unfortunately, lacunae in the text (lines 13–14) prevent further knowledge of the actual charges. Regardless of the exact nature of his political activities, Sosus apparently was the principal actor in the Dymaeian *stasis*, and he was also the man who established laws at Dyme contrary (*ὑπεναντίως*) to the *politeia* Rome had approved for the Dymaeans.<sup>4</sup> Fabius endorsed the death penalty for Sosus and his accomplice *-μίσκος*, son of Echesthenes; Timotheus was sent to Rome to be under custody of the *praetor inter peregrinos* (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684.26–27, τῶ[ι ἐ]πὶ τῶν ξένων στρατη[γῶι]).<sup>5</sup> The enemies of Sosus and his associ-

<sup>3</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684, with Morstein-Marx 1995a for improved Greek text, epigraphic commentary, and further discussion of historical context; photograph in Boardman, Griffin, and Murray 1986: 431; Bagnall and Derow 2004: 93–94 (no. 52) for recent translation. For the identity of Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus (cos. 142; *MRR* 1.474) and what in my view constitutes compelling evidence for dating the inscription to 144/143, see Ferrary 1988: 189–90; Morstein-Marx 1995a: 141–43.

<sup>4</sup> The inscription (line 8) refers to the events by the rare word *σύγχυσις*, not *στάσις*. Morstein-Marx 1995a: 131–32 and n10, argues that *σύγχυσις* here probably simply means “disturbance,” as in Polybius (e.g. 14.5.8; 15.25.8–9; 30.22.7); when the historian means “revolutionary violence,” which scholars have wanted to see in the Dyme inscription, he uses *κίνημα/κίνησις* (e.g. 2.39.2; 4.23.1, 5; 5.25.7, 29.3, 50.2, 54.13; 15.25.37) or *στάσις* (e.g. 1.9.1, 66.10; 2.58.1; 3.30.2; 6.44.5; 11.28.2; 14.6.3; 35.4.12). But occurrences of *στάσις* as “revolution” are surprisingly infrequent in epigraphic texts; I know of no usage in Greek inscriptions of *κίνημα/κίνησις* with this meaning. On the other hand, the words *νεωτερίζω/νεωτερισμός* are attested epigraphically as “political revolution” (e.g. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 173.62; 643.24; 880.39), yet Polybius employs these words only twice (5.29.9; 7.3.6). Polybius prefers *καινοτομέω/καινοτομία* for “political revolution”: 1.9.1; 13.1.2; 15.30.1; 22.4.1; 35.2.8, with Mauersberger 1956–75: 1229. These words rarely occur in epigraphic texts—most occurrences refer to the leasing of mines; I have been unable to find an inscription in which *καινοτομία* means “revolution.” Polybian vocabulary, therefore, cannot be employed to foreclose the possibility that *σύγχυσις* means something like “revolutionary violence” in *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684. Moreover, what we do know about the events at Dyme—burning of a record office, destruction of public records, passage of new laws, and factional appeals to external authority—allows for use of the familiar term *stasis* in describing them. For Polybius’s views on socio-economic revolution, see Mendels 1979, 1981, and 1982.

<sup>5</sup> The *praetor qui inter peregrinos ius dicit* is most likely identical to the *στρατηγός* who was in charge of the Achaean detainees in Rome (Polyb. 31.23.5), following Morstein

ates clearly brought their political activities to the attention of the Roman praetorian proconsul, who was at Patrae, and only then did he intervene in the Dymaeon affair.

The dramatic incident at Achaean Dyme in 144/143 is but one of many examples of second-century Greek states turning to Roman authority in order to resolve political conflict. Polybius states that the pace of Greek overtures to Roman power quickened in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War, as Greek embassies flocked to Rome in order to congratulate the Senate on Perseus's defeat (Polyb. 30.13.1–5, 30.1).<sup>6</sup> The new Greek political orientation towards Rome in the first half of the second century was reflected in cults dedicated to Roma (the first at Smyrna in 195), *Rhomaia* festivals, the earliest known examples at Euboean Chalcis, perhaps instituted in 194, and at Delphi in 189, and the colossal statue of the Roman people erected in 163 at Rhodes in the temple of Athena.<sup>7</sup> Greeks now hailed Roman senators collectively as common benefactors (see Erskine 1994 and 1997; cf. already Polyb. 2.12.5–6).

As a conspicuous example of subservient Greek behavior in the presence of Roman authority, Polybius reports with disgust the servile flattery of King Prusias II of Bithynia, who addressed Roman senators as “savior deities” (30.18.1–7, θεοὶ σωτῆρες; cf. Liv. 45.44.4–21). He condemns the Achaean politician Callicrates and his followers because they advised Roman senators to prop up staunchly pro-Roman collaborators in the Greek states who would defer to Rome's will on all matters. Thus Callicrates emerges in the Polybian account as “the initiator of great evils for all the Greeks.” Polybius goes on to allege that the supine Callicrates, Andronidas, and their followers were so reviled in Achaea that the Sicyonians would not enter baths they had used at the time of the Antigoneia festival until new water was drawn, free of the pollution of these men (Polyb. 24.10.8, μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πασι...τοῖς Ἑλλήσι; 30.29.3–6; with Eckstein 1995: 203–6).

---

Marx 1995a: 140, *contra* Walbank 1979: 496. On the origins of the magistracy, see now Brennan 2000: 85–89.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Polyb. 30.13.4–10; Liv. 45.31.8 for the effect of Rome's victory over Perseus on Greek intra-polis politics.

<sup>7</sup> Smyrna: Tac. *Ann.* 4.56; cf. Liv. 38.39.11; Euboean *Rhomaia*: *IG* 12.9.899b, with Mellor 1975: 99; Delphian *Rhomaia*: *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 611 and n3, with Mellor 100–1, 165–80; Rhodian colossus: Polyb. 31.4.4, with Champion 2004b: 48–49 and references at 49n67. The famous bilingual dedication, now lost, of the Lycian *koinon* to Capitoline Jupiter and the Roman people (*poplo Romano*; τῷ δήμῳ[ι] | Ῥωμαίων) on the Capitoline may date to 167 or soon thereafter, but the *koinon*'s cult to Roma may go back to the early 180s: *CIL* 1<sup>2</sup>.725 (*CIL* 6.372; cf. *CIL* 6, pt. 4.2, 30920); *IGRR* 1.61; *OGIS* 551; *ILS* 31, with Mellor 1975: 37–38, 61n217, 204 and n3; Ste. Croix 1981: 322 and n48.

Taking into account Polybius's impassioned hatred of Callicrates, we may well doubt the veracity of the most extreme allegations against the Achaean politician, but Callicrates' complete submission to Roman authority stands. Subsequent Achaean politicians followed his line of approach to Rome. Two political issues of pressing concern to Achaean leaders in this period serve to illustrate the point. First is the question of Sparta's membership within the Achaean Confederation. The Achaean statesman Philopoemen incorporated Sparta in autumn 192 (Liv. 35.37.1–3). But Spartan secessionist impulses arose immediately and persisted down to the time of the Achaean War. Sparta succeeded in asserting its independence for brief periods in 189 and again in the winter of 183/182 (Errington 1969: 297–99; Gruen 1984: 119–23; cf. Ager 1996: 263–66, no. 96, 298–302, no. 111). More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, in winter 184/183 no less than four separate embassies appealed to the Roman Senate on the Spartan question (Polyb. 23.4.1–6).<sup>8</sup> Another burning political controversy in Achaean political circles was the issue of the Achaean political prisoners taken in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War and detained in Italy, of whom Polybius was of course one. Achaean embassies repeatedly appeared before the Roman Senate on behalf of the hostages: in 164, 159, twice in 155, and in 153 (Polyb. 30.32.1–12; 32.3.14–17; 33.1.3–8, 3.1–2; 33.14.1). Both of these cases strikingly demonstrate the degree to which Greek politicians came to seek Roman intervention in order to resolve the confederation's internal problems.

In a famous debate the statesmen Philopoemen and Aristaenus offered opposing viewpoints on the correct Achaean approach to Rome. Aristaenus (from Dyme) believed the Achaeans must obey all Roman directives, even when they ran counter to the *koinon*'s laws. He argued that all foreign policy has two aims: the noble (τὸ καλόν) and the advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον). Only the latter, in his view, was still within the Achaeans' reach, and they should make the best of it. Philopoemen, by contrast, did not deny Rome's overwhelming strength, but he maintained that the Achaeans should work to hold off Achaea's complete, and inevitable, submission to Roman power for as long as possible (Polyb. 24.11.1–13.10; with Pédech 1964: 417; Petzold 1969: 43–46; Gruen 1984: 331–33; Eckstein 1987; Champion 2004b: 155).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the independent Spartan embassy to Rome in 191 at Polyb. 21.1.1–4. For Achaean-Spartan conflict in the events leading up to the Achaean War, see Ager 1996: 405–9, no. 147.

<sup>9</sup> Walbank 1979: 264–65 discusses Polybius's treatment of the paired speeches, their historicity, and possible dates. See further Polyb. 24.9.3–7; Liv. 35.33.1, 34.3; 42.5.2–6, 30.1.

Polybius believed Aristaenus's position had won out among Greek states in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War. The consequence was increasingly frequent resort to "collaborationist" Greek appeals to the Roman Senate in the two decades between the war against Perseus and the debacle of 146. Insofar as it represented a second-century Greek petition to external Roman authority in order to solve internal political crisis, the embassy of Cyllanius from Achaean Dyme to the Roman praetorian proconsul at Patrae was a commonplace in this period.

## II. GREEK POLITICAL RHETORIC AND PUTATIVE ROMAN CLASS PREJUDICES

Second-century Greek politicians regularly appealed to putatively conservative Roman class prejudices in their political struggles in the presence of Roman authorities. But allegations of demagogic politics and socio-economic revolutionary schemes were in place in Greek intramural and international politics long before the Romans came upon the scene. Indeed, in general terms, the Greek intellectuals whose writings have survived were political conservatives; for them socio-economic leveling, cancellation of debts, and redistribution of property were political anathema. Of course there were exceptions, such as Phaleas of Chalcedon, who argued that civil strife arises from property disputes and that property equalization was the best means of avoiding intra-polis factional conflict. But Aristotle vehemently censured Phaleas, arguing that his schemes for property equalization were absurd, since the just desire for material inequality based on merit would result in further conflict (Arist. *Pol.* 1266a31–67b21; cf. 1281a14–24; 1305a5–7; 1309a14–17 [property redistribution]; 1304b19–22a [demagogues and property], with Lintott 1992).<sup>10</sup>

Achaean politicians undoubtedly would have held similar reactionary views to Phaleas's ideas. Federal magistrates of the Achaean Confederation came

<sup>10</sup> For Aristotle's critique of communism, focusing on Plato's *Republic*, see *Pol.* 1260b36–64b4. To be sure, Aristotle felt that no state can exist in a healthy condition if some of its citizens are destitute, and that provisions must be taken to avoid this state of affairs (*Pol.* 1330a3). For Aristotle's views on private property, see e.g. *Pol.* 1329a17–26; *Rhet.* 1360b–61a, with Irwin 1991; Miller 1995: 309–31; and now Balot 2006: 250–53. Underlying Aristotle's discussion are Greek political ideas of "arithmetical" vs. "geometrical" equality (cf. *EN* 1131a14–24, with Harvey 1965). On Phaleas, see Nestle 1938; Lana 1950; and Balot 2001 for Aristotle's criticism. *Ar. Eccl.* 655–74 (cf. 590, κοινῶν εἶν πάντας; Diod. 5.9.4–5 on Lipara), appears to be a comic farce of such ideas. I regard the famous Socratic recommendation to abolish property (e.g. *Pl. Resp.* 416d3–17b8; 421a8–22a3; 592a10–b5, with Schofield 1999: 79), as antithetical to the mainstream of ancient Greek political thought and praxis (see Arist. *Pol.* 1260b27; Polyb. 6.47.7–10; Cic. *Resp.* 2.30.52, "requisivit civitatemque optandam magis quam sperandam"; cf. Socrates' own admission

from only a few dominant poleis and indeed from a few dominant families within those poleis.<sup>11</sup> These families consisted exclusively of wealthy property owners, and only their members would have had the necessary leisure time and means to attend the variable sites of Achaean federal meetings.<sup>12</sup> Polybius provides ample evidence for conservative charges that aristocratic Achaean statesmen would have brought against political enemies in their assemblies, and his scathing account of the Spartan king Cleomenes III as radical socio-economic reformer will have relied upon the memoirs of the prominent Achaean statesman Aratus of Sicyon.<sup>13</sup>

Allegations of demagogic politics and schemes for socio-economic revolution, therefore, were hardly first devised for Roman consumption, and they undoubtedly reflected the conservative convictions of political elites throughout Greece. Roman responses to such allegations, it must be said, were often highly complex. They sometimes reflected Roman conservative predilections, hostile to any revolutionary disturbance of existing property arrangements or redistribution of wealth. But positive Roman responses to these Greek charges would also have demonstrated that Roman authorities spoke the same political language as Greek elites, and they even would have helped to assert the civilized nature of Romans in the eyes of conservative Greek politicians, countering second-century Greek charges of Roman barbarism.<sup>14</sup> Moreover,

---

at *Resp.* 592b2–5; Fuks 1979–1980 [Fuks 1984: 172–89]; and Dawson 1992 on ancient Greek utopian communistic thought experiments). Plato, at any rate, advocates abolition of private property and the nuclear family only for his guardian class. For Roman elite attitudes, see e.g. *Liv.* 1.47.11–12; *Cic. Att.* 1.19.4; *Off.* 1.20; 2.73, 78; *Leg.* 3.19; *Resp.* 1.43, 53; 2.39–40, with Fantham 1973; cf. Ste. Croix 1981: 300–26, 337–50, 518–37. For “Greek” and “Roman” traditions on private property in early modern European and Anglo-American republican thought, see now Nelson 2004, with the reservations of Champion 2006.

<sup>11</sup> See O’Neil 1984/1986; cf. the Achaean principle for selection of magistrates at *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 665.34: ἐκ πάντων ἀριστίνδην; also *IG* 7.188.9, where Boeotian and Achaean arbiters in a border dispute are designated as [αἶρε]τοὺς πλουτίνδα καὶ ἀριστίνδα.

<sup>12</sup> See Aymard 1938: 147–48, 277–317, 405; cf. Larsen 1968: 88. High magistracies of the Achaean Confederation were probably unpaid offices: Aymard 1938: 331–37; Larsen 1955: 95; Walbank 1957: 222; cf. Polyb. 28.7.7 (Archon).

<sup>13</sup> On Polybius and Cleomenes, see Mendels 1981. On Polybius’s conservative, aristocratic background, see Eckstein 1995: 1–16; Champion 2004b: 15–18 and literature cited there. For Polybius’s use of Aratus’s memoirs, see Walbank 1957: 228; Pédech 1964: 156n288; Larsen 1968: 314; Gruen 1972: 617–20; Urban 1979: 100n16. Aratus condemned Cleomenes III for abolition of wealth and alleviation of poverty (Plut. *Cleom.* 16).

<sup>14</sup> For second-century Greek charges of Roman barbarism, see Erskine 2000; Champion 2000a and 2000b; Champion 2004b: 47–57.



and this is a vitally important point, Roman responses to socio-economic crises in Greece were not always in favor of the possessing classes.<sup>15</sup>

Yet Greek politicians routinely employed this sort of allegation in the presence of Roman authority, apparently expecting to strike a responsive chord with the Roman ruling elite. From Plutarch we learn that in Rome's war against Antiochus III, the Seleucid monarch was charged with demagoguery, and that stories circulated in the 190s that demagogues ruled Greece at the time of the war (see Plut. *Flam.* 15; *Cat. Mai.* 12; Mendels 1978b; also Liv. 35.34.3–4, with Mendels 1978a: 68). In 196 Boeotian politicians represented their opponents as rabble-rousers before T. Quinctius Flaminius. In 192 Aetolian ἀπόκλητοι (“selected councilors”) were charged with attempting to stir up social revolution by courting the multitude, and in 171/170 Aetolians accused one another before Roman authorities of having aroused the passions of the mob.<sup>16</sup>

Polybius provides important, and overlooked, evidence for further Greek appeals to Roman conservative class prejudices. In Book Six (57.9) he argues that ochlocracy is the absolute worst political condition. The corrupted δῆμος is parasitic (6.9.8), and the common people at Rome pose a threat to the Senate's traditional power and authority (6.16.3–5). Turning to Greek political affairs, Polybius reveals his own class prejudices by disparagingly commenting on the “pack of manual laborers and common men” (38.12.5, πλῆθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων), who attended the Achaean σύνοδος at Corinth in the spring of 146. He repeatedly condemns Greek politicians for demagogic politics, and his own political career within the Achaean Confederation provides a key to understanding his motivations in so doing.

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Liv. 42.5.8–10, “cum iniusto faenore gravatum aes alienum, ipsis magna ex parte concedentibus qui onerarent levasset, iusti crediti solutionem in decem annorum pensiones distribuit” (Ap. Claudius in Thessaly in 173, “When [Appius Claudius] lightened the burden of debts which had been made more onerous by illegal interest, with most of the creditors who had imposed it making this concession, he provided for the payment of the legal debts in ten annual installments”), with Walsh 2000: 301; cf. Gruen 1976; Morstein-Marx 1995b: 74–76. Greek support for or hostility against Rome did not neatly align with class divisions; see Mendels 1978b: 36 and nn43–44; cf. Derow 1972: 306–9, on the distortion of Livy's dichotomy of pro-Roman *principes* and an anti-Roman *multitudo* or *vulgus* in Greek cities, where there is no evidence for it in the Polybian source. But the important point here is that Greek politicians regularly appealed to putatively conservative Roman class prejudices, not that Romans always acted in accordance with them.

<sup>16</sup> Boeotia in 196: Polyb. 18.43.7–11; Aetolia in 192: Liv. 35.34.2–3; in 171/170: Polyb. 28.4.10–12, with Walsh 2000, adducing evidence for drought or blight in eastern central Greece and consequent food shortages and financial hardships for farmers.



His political enemy Callicrates, who was instrumental in the historian's arrest and extradition to Rome, had in 180 charged members of his political circle with being in league with the Achaean ὄχλος, πολλοί, and πλῆθος (Polyb. 24.8.9–9.6).<sup>17</sup> Polybius's frequent and vehement denunciations of demagogues reflected the ideological grammar of Greek factional politics in the presence of Roman authority, and they likely served as a rebuttal of allegations on the part of his political opposition in Achaea that his own political orientation was at odds with Roman conservative political values.<sup>18</sup>

King Perseus's enemies brought allegations of revolutionary plans against him before the Roman Senate. In the diplomatic preliminaries to the Third Macedonian War, Eumenes II of Pergamum entered the Curia and charged that the Macedonian king had instigated revolutions and supported civil disturbances throughout Greece; and later Q. Marcius Philippus repeated the accusations, adding that Perseus had destroyed leading men in Aetolia (Liv. 42.13.8–9; App. *Mac.* 11; Liv. 42.40.7–8 for Philippus's allegations). A Roman decree erected at Delphi in 172/171 (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 643.21–24) echoed these charges. It alleged that Perseus had murdered socio-economic elites (διαφθείρων τοὺς προεσθηκό[τας]), stirred up revolutionary activity (νεωτερισμὸν ἐποίει), and brought about severe disturbances in Greece, especially in Aetolia, Perhaebia, and Thessaly (ὅλον τὸ ἔθνος εἰ[ς] ταραχάς).

This Greek political strategy, in which Greek leaders represented their political opposition as demagogic, social revolutionaries, supplies a compelling interpretative context for understanding the events in Achaean Dyme. Fabius's letter describes the political activities of Sosus and his associates as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ διαπραί[ξά]μενοι ταῦτα ἐφαίνοντό μοι τῆς χειρίστης κ[ατασ]τάσεως | [κ]αὶ ταραχῆς (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684.11–13, "Since, then, those who did these things were in my view clearly laying the [foundation] for the worst state of affairs and disorder etc."). These lines reflect Polybius's language for socio-economic revolution. Polybius describes the troubled period encompassing the Third Punic, Fourth Macedonian, and Achaean Wars, in which his text reveals widespread socio-economic disturbances in Greece, as one of ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις (3.4.13, with Walbank 1972: 29–30). Polybian ταραχὴ clearly can mean "political revolution."<sup>19</sup> Polybius describes the Achaean

<sup>17</sup> See Aymard 81–82 and 82n1 for the pejorative ὄχλος in Polybius; Nottmeyer 1995: 70n118, 80n70 for the Polybian ὄχλος and πολλοί. On Callicrates' embassy to Rome in 180, see Derow 1970.

<sup>18</sup> See Champion 2004c for expanded argument on Polybian demagogues; for Polybius's Roman readership, see Polyb. 6.11.3–8; 31.22.8, with Champion 2004b: 4n5.

<sup>19</sup> See e.g. Polyb. 2.39.3–4 (Magna Graecia), φόνου καὶ στάσεως καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς ("[Greek cities full of] murder, sedition, and every sort of disturbance"); 11.25.5,

politician Critolaus's policies as ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖριστα (38.9.4; cf. 38.11.10–11 for Critolaus's debt-relief for the poor), and he again uses *ταραχή* in his account of the Achaean politician Diaeus's measures, which included financial exactions against the rich (38.15.6–11). In his account of the evil influences of the demagogue Charops in Epirus, Polybius writes of the unsettled conditions in Epirus τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ῥηπειρον ἔτ' ἐν ἀκαταστασίαις ἦν καὶ *ταραχαῖς* (Polyb. 32.5.5).<sup>20</sup> Finally, Polybius discusses his own role in helping the Roman decemviral commission establish new constitutions throughout Greece (τὴν δεδομένην πολιτείαν; cf. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684.9–10, 19–20); had he not done so, he maintains, a political nightmare would have resulted, ἄκριτα πάντα ἦν καὶ πολλῆς γέμοντα *ταραχῆς* (Polyb. 39.5.5–6).<sup>21</sup>

Although epigraphic texts do not widely attest *ταραχή*, its use in the inscription from Delphi (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 643.21–24) and in Polybius provides a clue to its meaning in *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 684. Cyllanius and his embassy may have represented Sosus and his associates as demagogic, would-be social revolutionaries to the Roman praetorian proconsul at Patrae, but earlier editors and interpreters of the inscription went well beyond the evidence in supplementing the text, making it into a prime example of anti-Roman, radical socio-economic revolution.<sup>22</sup> In

---

τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γενομένης ἀντιπολιτείας καὶ στάσεις καὶ *ταραχὰς* ("internal strife among them, sedition, and disturbance"); 27.1.7–8, ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις συνέβαινε *ταραχὰς* εἶναι καὶ στάσεις ("it came to pass in Thebes that there were seditions and disturbances").

<sup>20</sup> For the collocation of ἀκαταστασία and *ταραχή* in Polybius, see further 1.70.1 (Carthaginian mercenary revolt); 14.9.6 (disorder at Carthage after Scipio's victory at the Great Plains).

<sup>21</sup> Further examples of Polybian *ταραχή* as "political revolution": 1.71.7–8; 2.8.5; 3.9.9; 4.22.3–4; 5.4.3; 15.30.10; 27.1.8; 28.4.13; 32.4.1; 38.12.1. *ταραχή* occurs as "political upheaval" in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Attic orators (*LSJ*<sup>9</sup> 1758); cf. Pl. *Alc.* 2.146b2; *OGIS* 90.20 (with Polyb. 5.107.1–3; 14.12.4); Plut. *Caes.* 33.5.

<sup>22</sup> Beasley's *χρεωκοπίας* (line 14) fits the lacuna, and historical reconstructions of socio-economic revolution at Dyme have relied on this supplement: Hicks 1882: 346 ("attempt at revolution"); Beasley 1900: 163 ("revolutionary attempt directed against the timocracy established by Rome"); Colin 1905: 654 ("un soulèvement socialiste"); Rostovtzeff 1941: 757 ("populace rose against the propertied classes with elemental force"), 1508–9 (n25); Deininger 1971: 243–44 ("Aktion...gegen bestimmte soziale und wirtschaftliche Mißstände"); Fuks 1972: 24 [Fuks 1984: 285], ("rule of the *possidentes* was abolished"); Schwertfeger 1974: 66–67 ("eine soziale Revolution"); Crawford 1977: 45–46 ("hostility to the upper classes"), conveniently in Champion 2004a: 98; Ste. Croix 1981: 306–7 ("revolution...caused in part by the burden of debt"); Baronowski 1988: 454 ("programme of legislative change and cancellation of debt"); Bertrand 1992: 235 ("slogans...demandant l'abolition des dettes et le partage des terres"). For a recent attempt to place the inscription within the wider socio-economic context of Greece in the 140s, see Thornton 2001: 149–72.

light of evidence assembled in this section for Greek political strategies in the presence of Roman authorities, the idea that Cyllanius's embassy represented Dymaeon unrest as the result of attempted socio-economic revolution is attractive, but ultimately conjectural. The Dymaeon text does unambiguously reveal *stasis*, arson, abolition of a political constitution approved by Rome, an appeal to external Roman authority, and Roman intervention to resolve the civil disturbance. The driving forces in the unfolding of events were Dymaeon, not Roman, and they support a model of Roman imperial expansion in Greece focusing on a subjected periphery rather than the imperial center.

### III. FROM CENTER TO PERIPHERY:

#### GREEK COLLABORATION AND ROMAN IMPERIALISM

Historical explanations of imperial expansion tend, openly or tacitly, consciously or unwittingly, towards one of three explanatory paradigms: metrocentric, systemic, or pericentric. The metrocentric model seeks to explain imperial expansion by analyzing political, social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the conquering power. The same attributes of the conquered receive relatively little attention. Following a famous precedent set by Polybius himself (6.53), most modern studies of Roman imperialism have focused on Roman political, social, and cultural institutions, both formal and informal; in other words, they have explained Roman imperial expansion by adopting a metrocentric approach.<sup>23</sup> Systemic analyses of empire, in contrast, view both conquering imperial center and conquered peripheral subject as part of an interlocking system. According to this view, states engage in endless struggles for power and security. The system may remain in an uneasy balance for considerable periods, but growth or collapse of a significant player can affect the system's fundamental nature. Thus the competitive structure of international relations itself may ultimately produce imperial states. Finally, the pericentric, or "excentric," model emphasizes historical influences on the development of imperialism exercised by "peripheral collaborators," who eventually become subordinated. There may be situations on the periphery in which collaborators practically issue invitations for intervention to the imperial center. One

<sup>23</sup>Influential examples include Mommsen 1903; Frank 1914; DeSanctis 1969; Badian 1958 and 1968; Harris 1979; see further Brunt 1978 (repr. in Champion 2004a: 163–85); Rich 1976 and 1993 (repr. in Champion 2004a: 46–67); Raaflaub 1996. Gruen 1984: 5–7 provides a concise and useful account of modern scholarly interpretations of Roman imperialism, all of which employ a predominantly metrocentric paradigm.

variety of this occurs in weak states that are divided politically, with one side asking for intervention from an imperial metropole.<sup>24</sup>

None of these theoretical paradigms can provide in itself a satisfactory explanatory model for the vast and complex historical evolution of Roman imperialism. But it is not difficult to see why the metrocentric model has held sway in modern studies of Roman imperial expansion. The militaristic ethos of the Roman republican ruling elite demands a central place in any study of Roman imperialism. It is exhibited in Roman aristocratic funeral eulogies, epitaphs, and processions, in intense elite competition for high military command and celebrations of triumphs, and in awareness of tangible material rewards of military successes. Polybius himself encourages the adoption of a metrocentric paradigm: he devotes an entire book (Book 6) to an analysis of the Roman *politeia*, maintaining that it was ideally structured for the acquisition of empire (6.48–50). In recounting the Roman war in Dalmatia in 157/156, Polybius states that the senators determined on war because Rome had not demonstrated its military capacity along the Illyrian Adriatic coast for a considerable period of time, since the defeat of Demetrius of Pharos, and the legions needed the work (32.13.4–9). Here Rome appears as a prime illustration of the economist J. A. Schumpeter's general comment on aggressive ancient empires: "*Created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required*" (Schumpeter 1951: 33, emphasis original).

Several influential modern studies have adopted the picture of republican Rome as an aggressive, bellicose, Schumpeterian war machine (DeSanctis 1969, Harris 1979, Raaflaub 1996), while others have seen Rome as a reluctant and defensively-minded imperialist (Mommsen 1903, Frank 1914, Holleaux 1921, Kostial 1995). But in the context of this discussion, it is irrelevant whether the Romans emerge as rapacious imperial wolves or law-abiding imperial adjudicators, exhausting formal Roman diplomatic institutions of fetal invocation and *rerum repetitio* before undertaking war as a last resort. In either case Rome stands at the center of the analysis. But metrocentric approaches have unsatisfactory explanatory power for certain Roman imperial moments, such as the Roman military inactivity that prompted Polybius's

<sup>24</sup> Perhaps the most famous pericentric argument is the study of nineteenth-century European imperialists in Africa by Robinson and Gallagher 1961 (161: "The paradoxical conduct of Gladstone's ministry shows that the taking of a new African empire originated in an almost involuntary reaction to African national movements, and not in a stronger will to empire in Britain"; cf. 462–72). See further Robinson 1972 on collaborationists and imperial peripheries; and Hodgkin 1972 for African and Third World theories of imperialism. On the three models, see briefly Doyle 1986: 22–30. Champion and Eckstein 2004 briefly discuss these models in relation to Roman imperialism.

remark on Roman motivations for the Dalmatian War,<sup>25</sup> or Roman intervention at Achaean Dyme.

A systemic theorist sees interstate dynamics such as those that prevailed in the world of the Hellenistic Greek powers as constituting a highly militarized system of international anarchy. Hellenistic Greek states struggled for power and security through warfare, and their mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution were almost non-existent, since attempts at third-party mediation (σύλλυσις) and/or arbitration (κρίσις) were often ineffectual, and there was no formal international peace-keeping agency.<sup>26</sup> These states, large and small, faced a situation of international relations in which the constant problem was one of conceiving “an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking” (Waltz 1979: 89). But an order of sorts did obtain in the Peloponnesus. Antigonid Macedonia and the Achaean Confederation were the principal power brokers there, who regulated Peloponnesian affairs in the second half of the third century, with sporadic but not insignificant interventions from Sparta, the Aetolian Confederation, and the Ptolemies. By 145, however, Roman power had obliterated the Antigonid monarchy in the Third Macedonian War, crushed the Aetolian Confederation in the Antiochene War, and dismantled the Achaean *koinon* in the Achaean War. Whatever precarious structure and stability the uneasy balances of the Hellenistic Greek powers had afforded the Peloponnesus now vanished.

Peloponnesian developments were part of larger systemic convulsions. Polybius targets the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad (220–216) as a historical watershed. In his estimation, this Olympiad witnessed the interconnection of world events, or *συμπλοκή*, prophetically announced by the Aetolian statesman Agelaus at an international conference of Greek states at Naupactus as early as 217 (Polyb. 5.104.1–11; cf. 5.30.8–31.8, with Walbank 1985: 313–24).<sup>27</sup> A decade after the Naupactus conference (ca. 207), the Ptolemaic kingdom began to crumble, leading to the aggressive designs of both Antiochus III and Philip V, and most importantly for this discussion, repeated embassies from Greek states to the Senate in winter 201/200 concerning their increasing insecurity.

<sup>25</sup> See Rich 1993: 44–55 for curious periods of Roman military inactivity during the Middle Republic.

<sup>26</sup> See Eckstein 2006 for the Hellenistic interstate system as a militarized international anarchy and for Rome’s impact upon the system. Ma 2000 provides an illuminating study of militarization and military capacity in smaller Hellenistic Greek states; see Magnetto 1997 and Ager 1996 for third-party arbitration in Hellenistic interstate relations.

<sup>27</sup> On the historiographical device of Agelaus’s speech as announcement of the *συμπλοκή*, see Champion 1997. For a study of the impact of this systemic transformation upon Polybius’s historiographical treatment of the Aetolians, see Champion 2007.

Systemic transformation of the international order was underway (Eckstein 2006: 104–116, 257–92). Polybius maintains that the transformation was clear to all in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War, when a Roman legate humbled a Hellenistic king. The infamous “Day of Eleusis,” on which C. Popillius Laenas drew a circle in the sand around Antiochus IV Epiphanes and demanded an answer before the monarch should step out of it, demonstrated that the Hellenistic powers were now the servants and subordinates of Rome (Polyb. 29.27.1–13; cf. 3.4.3; Gruen 1984: 659n226). In terms of systemic analysis of interstate relations, the incident underscored the fact that the old Hellenistic world order had undergone a complete and total systems collapse.

Confronted by this power vacuum, Greek poleis increasingly turned to Rome for adjudication of both intra-polis factional strife and inter-polis conflict. In terms of the former, Cyllanius’s embassy to Fabius at Patrae was but one of many such Greek appeals to Roman authority. Several of these gambits concerned the problem of debt, which may well have been a pressing issue at Achaean Dyme.<sup>28</sup> In the first half of the second century these pericentric appeals of weak Greek states to superordinate Roman power were indeed “invitations to empire.”<sup>29</sup> Rome’s response in this period sought to avoid unnecessary entanglements and cumbersome imperial administrative responsibilities, and scholars have made much of Roman reluctance to annex extra-Italian territory directly, leading some to prefer to call Rome’s exercise of power among foreign states hegemony rather than empire.<sup>30</sup>

Cyllanius and his Dymaeon embassy convinced Fabius Maximus that his group’s policies were aligned with the Roman political agenda, and that Sosus’s program was inimical to these. In Dyme, as elsewhere in Greece, the political stakes of factional strife before Roman authority were high. Rome did not hesitate to reward *amici* and punish those perceived as enemies. For

<sup>28</sup> E.g. Crete: Liv. 41.25.7; Thessaly and Perrhaebia: Liv. 42.5.7–10, 13.9; App. *Mac.* 11; Diod. 29.33; Aetolia: Liv. 41.25.1–6, 27.4; 42.2.2, 4.5, 5.10–12. Roman responses were desultory and indifferent; see Gruen 1984: 101–11; cf. Ager 1996: xiv: “[L]ong after Rome became dominant in matters of Greek interstate relations, it was still passing on the actual task of arbitration to other neutral Greek states.”

<sup>29</sup> For the phrase, see Lundestad 1986, expanded in Lundestad 1990: 31–115, esp. 54–62.

<sup>30</sup> On the question of Roman annexation, see Dahlheim 1977: 168–73; Badian 1968: 1–59; Harris 1979: 131–62; Gruen 1984: 287n64; Morstein-Marx 1995b: 1–8; cf. the observations of Gallagher and Robinson 1953 on mid-Victorian British imperialism and “formal empire.” On ambiguities of Roman *imperium* and Roman *provinciae*, see Lintott 1981.

example, T. Quinctius Flamininus spent an entire winter in 194 at Elatia, adjudicating cases to the disadvantage of those friendly to Macedonia (Liv. 34.48.2–3). In 172/171, Q. Marcius Philippus and A. Atilius Serranus headed an embassy that warmly received envoys from Chaeronea and Thebes. Their purpose was to disavow the Boeotian Confederation's decision to join Perseus, thus dissociating their cities from that ill-fated policy. On the other hand, two Boeotian statesmen who sought to maintain the confederacy intact were imprisoned and ultimately driven to suicide (Polyb. 27.1.1–2.10; Liv. 42.38.5–6, 43.4–44.7). In 167 L. Aemilius Paullus held an investigation in order to discover who had been Roman friends and who had favored King Perseus in the Third Macedonian War. Aetolians, Acarnanians, Epirotes, and Boeotians were tried, and some undoubtedly executed; Lesbian Antissa was destroyed because it had supplied the king's general Antenor; and the Aetolian leader Andronicus and the Boeotian politician Neon were put to death as enemies of the Roman people (Liv. 45.31.1–15). Finally, in the aftermath of the Achaean War, L. Mummius executed a group of Chalcidian ἱππεῖς (Polyb. 39.6.5). The fate of Sosus and μίσκος, son of Echesthenes, at Achaean Dyme was unexceptional.

The incident at Dyme stands at the beginning of an evolution in Greece from Roman informal and indirect forms of control to more formal and direct ones. We might choose to call this a movement from hegemony towards empire, a drawn out and tortuous development whose details go well beyond the scope of this article.<sup>31</sup> Dyme's part in this process after 144/143 is for the most part lost to us. Cicero reports that the Dymaeans, expelled from their city long after the Sosus affair, turned to maritime raiding. Pompey later settled a number of Cilician pirates on the site after his campaign of 67 (Cic. *Att.* 16.1; Strabo 8.7.5 (C 388); Plut. *Pomp.* 28.4; App. *Mithr.* 96, with Souza 1999: 184–85). A Roman colony under Caesar and Antony, Dyme became *colonia Augusta Dumaeorum* under Augustus, later to be annexed to Patrae (Paus. 7.17.5–6). Whatever was left of Dyme thereafter would have been “liberated” along with the rest of Achaia by the emperor Nero, only to be subjected again to tribute and Roman governors in the reign of Vespasian (Suet. *Ner.* 24.2; Plin. *HN* 4.6.22; Paus. 7.17.2–4; Plut. *Flam.* 12.8; *Mor.* 567F–568A; Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 5.41.1; *ILS* 8794.10–15; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 13.50, with Lafond 1997).

<sup>31</sup> On the development of the Roman *imperium* in Greece, see Morstein-Marx 1995b *passim*, and literature cited there.



## CONCLUSION

The case of Dyme in 144/143 as a study in Greek “collaborationist” strategies and “invitations to empire” in the face of Roman power is not unique. But it is especially dramatic and poignant. This once fiercely independent polis, a member of the Achaean *koinon* that had arbitrated a dispute between the Boeotians and Rome in 196 (Liv. 33.29.7–12, with Magnetto 1997: 450–54, no. 76; Ager 1996: 210–11, no. 75), erected, a little more than half a century later, this startling epigraphic text documenting the newer Greek approach to resolving internal civil unrest: direct appeal and submission to Roman authority.<sup>32</sup> Polybius and other sources, literary and epigraphic, provide evidence for a Greek political strategy in the presence of Roman authority: incriminations of socio-economic revolutionary schemes and overtures to putatively conservative Roman class prejudices. The charges of Cyllanius and his embassy against Sosus and his associates at Dyme may have run along these lines, but the inscription does not allow for more than probable conjecture. It is worth reiterating that such charges most certainly reflected the genuine political convictions of Greek elites, and that Roman responses were not always in their favor. Indeed, what evidence we have suggests that Greek political rhetoric of socio-economic revolution frequently was ineffectual in influencing Roman behavior; questions of socio-economic class were not paramount in Roman decision-making. Rome rewarded perceived friends and punished perceived enemies. But regardless of its efficacy, the Greek political strategy in the presence of Roman authority is beyond dispute. Finally, the inscription joins other ample historical evidence in providing stark testimony to Rome’s increasingly crucial role, initiated by the promptings of divided Greek politicians, in the discursive construction and performance of sovereignty and legitimacy in the second-century Greek polis.

<sup>32</sup> In the fall of 198, when it became clear in an Achaean federal meeting that the *koinon* would form an alliance with the Romans, representatives from Dyme, Argos, and Megalopolis rose in protest and left the council (Liv. 32.22.8–12). Cf. Ager 1996: 410–46 for Roman involvement in a series of Greek border disputes in the 140s; esp. 425–29, no. 156 (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 674; *RDGE* 9; cf. Ager 1996: 420–23, no. 154), for embassies to the Senate ca. 140 from Melitaea and Narthacium, of “independent” Thessaly, concerning disputed territorial claims. The Senate directly adjudicated the case (cf. Ager 1996: 450–57, no. 160). The classic example is the “philosophical embassy” of 155 to Rome, in which the Senate partially remitted a fine of 500 talents imposed on Athens by the Sicyonians as third-party arbitrators; see Champion 2004b: 197 and n83 for brief discussion and sources. Finally, in 145 the proconsul L. Mummius himself and the Roman *decemviri* seem to have settled a dispute between Argos and Kleonai over control of the Nemean Games: *SEG* 23 (1968), 180, with Bradeen 1966: 326–29 and Plate 78, no. 7.

WORKS CITED

- Ager, S. L. 1996. *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 BC*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Aymard, A. 1938. *Les assemblées de la Confédération achaienne (198–189 avant J.-C.): étude critique d'institutions et d'histoire*. Bordeaux: Féret et fils.
- Badian, E. 1958. *Foreign Clientelae, 264–70 B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1968. *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bagnall, R. S., and P. Derow, eds. 2004. *Historical Sources in Translation: The Hellenistic Period*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Balakrishnan, G. ed. 2003. *Debating Empire*. London and New York: Verso.
- Balot, R. K. 2001. "Aristotle's Critique of Phaleas: Justice, Equality, and *Pleonexia*." *Hermes* 129: 32–44.
- . 2006. *Greek Political Thought*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Baronowski, D. W. 1988. "The Provincial Status of Mainland Greece after 146 B.C.: A Criticism of Erich Gruen's Views." *Klio* 70: 448–60.
- Beasley, T. W. 1900. "An Inscription of Dyme in Achaia." *CR* 14: 162–64.
- Bertrand, J.-M. 1992. *Inscriptions historiques grecques, Traduites et commentées*. Paris: Les belles lettres.
- Billows, R. 2003. "Cities." In A. Erskine, ed. *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell. 196–215.
- Boardman, J., J. Griffin, and O. Murray, eds. 1986. *The Oxford History of the Classical World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bradeen, D. W. 1966. "Inscriptions from Nemea." *Hesperia* 35: 320–30.
- Brennan, T. Corey. 2000. *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brunt, P. A. 1978. "Laus Imperii." In P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds. *Imperialism in the Ancient World: Cambridge University Seminar in Ancient History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 159–91.
- Cartledge, P. 1997. "Introduction." In P. Cartledge, P. Garnsey, and E. Gruen, eds. *Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1–19.
- Champion, C. B. 1997. "The Nature of Authoritative Evidence in Polybius and the Speech of Agelaus at Naupactus." *TAPA* 127: 111–28.
- . 2000a. "Histories 12.4b.1–4c.1: An Overlooked Key to Polybios' Views on Rome." *Histos* 4: no pagination. <[www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/](http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/)>.
- . 2000b. "Romans as BARBAROI: Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indeterminacy." *CP* 95: 425–44.
- . ed. 2004a. *Roman Imperialism: Readings and Sources*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- . 2004b. *Cultural Politics in Polybius's Histories*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2004c. "Polybian Demagogues in Political Context." *HSCP* 102: 199–212.
- . 2006. Review of Nelson, "Classical Republicans: Greek and Roman, Ancient and Modern." *Polis* 23: 387–98.

- . 2007. "Polybius and Aetolia: A Historiographical Approach." In J. Marincola, ed. *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell. 356–62.
- , and A. M. Eckstein. 2004. "Introduction." In Champion 2004a. 1–10.
- Colin, G. 1905. *Rome et la Grèce de 200 à 146 av. J.-C.* Paris: Fontemoins.
- Crawford, M. H. 1977. "Rome and the Greek World: Economic Relationships." *Econ-HistRev* 30: 42–52.
- Dahlheim, W. 1977. *Gewalt und Herrschaft: Das provinciale Herrschaftssystem der römischen Republik*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Dawson, D. 1992. *Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deininger, J. 1971. *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rome in Griechenland, 217–86 v.Chr.* Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Derow, P. S. 1970. "Polybios and the Embassy of Kallikrates." In *Essays Presented to C. M. Bowra*. Oxford: The Alden Press for Waldham College. 12–23.
- . 1972. Review of Deininger, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rome in Griechenland, 217–86 v.Chr.* *Phoenix* 26: 303–11.
- DeSanctis, G. 1969. *Storia dei Romani* IV.1. Florence: La Nuova Italia. Reprint of 1923 edition.
- Doyle, M. W. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eckstein, A. M. 1987. "Polybius, Aristaenus, and the Fragment 'On Traitors.'" *CQ* n.s. 37: 140–62.
- . 1995. *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2006. *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Errington, R. M. 1969. *Philopoemen*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Erskine, A. 1994. "The Romans as Common Benefactors." *Historia* 43: 70–87.
- . 1997. "Greekness and Uniqueness: The Cult of the Senate in the Greek East." *Phoenix* 51: 25–35.
- . 2000. "Polybios and Barbarian Rome." *MedAnt* 3(1): 165–82.
- Fantham, E. 1973. "Aequabilitas in Cicero's Political Theory and the Greek Tradition of Proportional Justice." *CQ* n.s. 23: 285–90.
- Ferrary, J.-L. 1988. *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*. Paris and Rome: Ecole française de Rome.
- Frank, T. 1914. *Roman Imperialism*. New York: Macmillan.
- Fuks, A. 1972. "Social Revolution in Dyme in 116–114 B.C.E." *ScriptHier* 23: 21–27.
- . 1979–1980. "Tois aporumenois koinonein: The Sharing of Property by the Rich and the Poor in Greek Theory and Practice." *SCI* 5: 46–63.
- . 1984. *Social Conflict in Ancient Greece*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Gallagher, J. and R. Robinson. 1953. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." *EconHistRev* n.s. 6: 1–15.
- Gruen, E. S. 1972. "Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon." *Historia* 21: 609–25.

- . 1976. "Class Conflict and the Third Macedonian War." *AJAH* 1: 29–60.
- . 1984. *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Habicht, C. 1997. *Athens from Alexander to Antony*. Trans. D. L. Schneider. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. and A. Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- . 2004. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin.
- Harris, W. V. 1979. *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Harvey, D. F. 1965. "Two Kinds of Equality." *C & M* 26: 101–46.
- Hicks, E. L. 1882. *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hodgkin, T. 1972. "Some African and Third World Theories of Imperialism." In E. R. J. Owen and R. Sutcliffe, eds. *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*. London: Longman. 93–114.
- Holleaux, M. 1921. *Rome, la Grèce, et les monarchies hellénistiques au III<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J. C. (273–205)*. Paris: de Boccard.
- Irwin, T. H. 1991. "Aristotle's Defense of Private Property." In D. Keyt and F. D. Miller, eds. *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell. 200–25.
- Kostial, M. 1995. *Kriegerisches Rom? Zur Frage von Unvermeidbarkeit und Normalität militärischer Konflikte in der römischen Politik*. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.
- Lafond, Y. 1997. "Dyme." In H. Cancik and H. Schneider, eds. *Der Neue Pauly*, vol. 3. Stuttgart: F. Steiner. 855.
- Lana, I. 1950. "Le teorie egualitarie di Falea di Calcedone." *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 5: 265–76.
- Larsen, J. A. O. 1955. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1968. *Greek Federal States: Their Institution and History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1992. "Aristotle and Democracy." *CQ* n.s. 42: 114–28.
- Lintott, A. W. 1981. "What Was the *Imperium Romanum*?" *G & R* n.s. 28: 53–67.
- Lundestad, G. 1986. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952." *Journal of Peace Research* 23: 263–77.
- . 1990. *The American "Empire" and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ma, J. 1999. *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2000. "Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World." In H. van Wees, ed. *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. London: Duckworth and the Classical Press of Wales. 337–76.
- Magnetto, A. 1997. *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci*, vol. 2. Pisa: Marlin.
- Mauersberger, A. 1956–1975. *Polybios-Lexicon*. 4 fasc. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Mellor, R. 1975. *ΘΕΑ ΡΩΜΗ. The Worship of the Goddess Roma in the Greek World*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

- Mendels, D. 1978a. "Perseus and the Socio-Economic Question in Greece (179–172/1 B.C.): A Study in Roman Propaganda." *AncSoc* 9: 55–73.
- . 1978b. "The Attitude of Antiochus III Towards the Class Struggle in Greece (192–191 B.C.)." *RSI* 8: 27–38.
- . 1979. "Polybius, Nabis, and Equality." *Athenaeum* 57: 311–33.
- . 1981. "Polybius and the Socio-Economic Reforms of Cleomenes III, Reexamined." *Grazer Beiträge* 10: 95–104.
- . 1982. "Polybius and the Socio-Economic Revolution in Greece (227–146 B.C.)." *AC* 51: 86–110.
- Miller, F. D. 1995. *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mommsen, T. 1903. *Römische Geschichte* I. Berlin: Weidmann. Reprint of 1854 edition.
- Morstein-Marx [Kallet-Marx], R. 1995a. "Quintus Fabius Maximus and the Dyme Affair (Syll.<sup>3</sup> 684)." *CQ* n.s. 45: 129–53.
- . 1995b. *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nelson, E. 2004. *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nestle, W. 1938. "Phaleas." *RE*, 19. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. 1658–59.
- Nottmeyer, H. 1995. *Polybios und das Ende des Achaierbundes: Untersuchungen zu den römisch-achaischen Beziehungen ausgehend von der Mission des Kallikrates bis zur Zerstörung Korinths*. Munich: Editio Maris.
- O'Neil, J. L. 1984/1986. "The Political Elites of the Achaian and Aitolian Leagues." *AncSoc* 15–17: 33–61.
- Passavant, P. A., and J. Dean, eds. 2004. *Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Pédech, P. 1964. *La méthode historique de Polybe*. Paris: Les belles lettres.
- Petzold, K. E. 1969. *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung*. Munich: Beck.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 1996. "Born to Be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism." In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris, eds. *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 273–314.
- Rich, J. 1976. *Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion*. Brussels: Latomus.
- . 1993. "Fear, Greed, and Glory: The Causes of Roman War-Making in the Middle Republic." In J. Rich and G. Shipley, eds. *War and Society in the Roman World*. London and New York: Routledge. 38–68.
- Robinson, J. 1972. "The Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration." In E. R. J. Owen and R. Sutcliffe, eds. *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*. London: Longman. 117–40.
- , and J. Gallagher. 1961. *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent*. London: St. Martins.
- Rostovtzeff, M. I. 1941. *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Schofield, M. 1999. *Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Schumpeter, J. A. 1951. *Imperialism and Social Classes*. Trans. H. Norden. New York: Blackwell.
- Schwertfeger, T. 1974. *Der achaiische Bund von 146 bis 27 v. Chr.* Munich: Beck.
- de Souza, P. 1999. *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1981. *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Thornton, J. 2001. *Lo Storico, Il Grammatico, Il Bandito: Momenti della Resistenza Greca all'Imperium Romanum*, 2nd ed. Catania: Edizioni del Prisma.
- Urban, R. 1979. *Wachstum und Krise des achäischen Bundes: Quellenstudien zur Entwicklung des Bundes von 280 bis 222 v. Chr.* Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.
- Walbank, F. W. 1957. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1972. *Polybius*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1979. *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1985. *Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walsh, J. J. 2000. "The Disorders of the 170s B.C. and Roman Intervention in the Class Struggle in Greece." *CQ* n.s. 50: 300–3.
- Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.